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Abstract 
We construct a theoretical framework that puts the social worth of a 
microfinance organization (MFO) in terms of the depth, worth to users, cost to users, 
breadth, length, and scope of its output. We then analyze evidence of depth of outreach 
for five MFOs in Bolivia. Most of the poor households reached by the MFOs were near 
the poverty line-they were the richest of the poor. Group lenders had more depth of 
outreach than individual lenders. The urban poorest were more likely to be borrowers, 
but rural borrowers were more likely to be among the poorest. 
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Microcredit and the Poorest of the Poor: 
Theory and Evidence From Bolivia 
1. Introduction 
The professed goal of public support for microcredit is to improve the welfare of 
poor households through better access to small loans. Often public funds for 
microfinance organizations (MFOs) carry a mandate to serve the poorest (Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poorest, 1995). For example, the Microcredit Summit in February 
1997 rallied support to seek more than $20 billion to provide microcredit to 100 million 
of the poorest households in the next ten years (Results International, 1996) . 
Microcredit is the newest darling of the aid community. In Latin America, most 
of the excitement is based on the fame of a few of the best MFOs. These include 
BancoSol, Caja Los Andes, PRODEM, and FIE in Bolivia; Caja Social in Colombia; 
ADEMI in the Dominican Republic; Financiera Calpia in El Salvador; Compartamos in 
Mexico; and ACP/MiBanco in Peru. Worldwide, the best-known MFOs are the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and the unit desa system of Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
(Yaron, Benjamin, and Piprek, 1997; Christen et al., 1995; Yaron, 1994). Grameen and 
BRI reach millions of depositors and borrowers, and many if not most are poor women. 
A survey of 200 of the thousands of MFOs worldwide found 13 million loans worth $7 
billion outstanding as of September 1995 (Paxton, 1996). 
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Although microcredit has claimed more and more of the aid budget, it may not 
always be the best way to help the poorest (Buckley, 1997; Rogaly, 1996) . The fervor 
for microcredit may siphon funds from other projects that might help the poor more. 
Governments and donors should know whether the poor gain more from more small 
loans than from, for example, more health care, food aid, or cash gifts. 
Are public funds for microcredit wasted or worthwhile? No one knows. Most 
measures of the impact of MFOs fail to control for what would have happened in their 
absence (Sebstad, Barnes, and Chen, 1995; Von Pischke and Adams, 1980). If users 
borrow more than once, then they must get benefits. The question, however, is not 
whether MFOs are better than nothing for their users. The question is whether MFOs 
are better than some other development project for the poor as a whole. 
We construct a theoretical framework for rigorous thought about the social 
worth of an MFO. The framework puts the standard theory of project analysis in terms 
of the jargon of microcredit. By defining precisely the social worth of service to the 
poorest, the framework helps to judge the trade-offs between service to the poorest and 
service to others. The goal is to render more explicit the judgements used to allot 
funds. 
We also address three empirical questions with evidence from a comparison of 
the poverty of a treatment group-borrowers of five MFOs in La Paz, Bolivia-with 
the poverty of a control group-the population of La Paz. The first empirical question 
is whether MFOs reach the poorest of the poor (Gulli, 1998; Hulme and Mosley, 1996). 
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We find that the five MFOs in Bolivia most often reached not the poorest of the poor 
but rather those just above and just below the poverty line. The theoretical framework 
lays out the conditions under which the MFOs may still have been a good way to help 
the poor. 
The second question is whether group loans reach the poorest better than 
individual loans. While the theory is well-known (Conning, 1997; Sadoulet, 1997), less 
is known about when the assumptions of theory hold in practice. We find that group 
lenders in Bolivia reached the poorest better than individual lenders. 
The third question is whether rural MFOs reach the poorest better than urban 
MFOs. Rural poverty is both wide and deep, but, compared with urban MFOs, rural 
MFOs must deal with more seasonality, worse information, greater risks, less smooth 
cash flows, longer distances, more diversity, and sparser populations. We find that the 
share of the poorest in the portfolio was highest for rural MFOs. We also find that 
since the urban MFOs had more borrowers, the share of the urban poorest who were 
borrowers exceeded the share of the rural poorest who were borrowers. 
Section 2 defines outreach. Section 3 briefly describes the empirical methods. 
Section 4 compares the distribution of an index of the fulfillment of basic needs for 
borrowers with the distribution of a similar measure for the population. Section 5 
concludes. 
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2. A theoretical framework of outreach 
Judgements of the performance of MFOs have been based on the concepts of 
outreach and sustainability (Yaron, 1994). Here, we express outreach and sustainability 
in terms of the theory of social welfare. The purpose is to reconcile the jargon of 
microcredit with the standard tools of project analysis (Gittinger, 1982). 
Outreach is the social value of the output of an MFO in terms of depth, worth to 
users, cost to users, breadth, length, and scope. Outreach is commonly proxied by the 
sex or poverty of borrowers, the terms of loan contracts, the price and transaction costs 
borne by borrowers, the number of borrowers, the financial strength of the MFO, and 
the number of products offered, including deposits. 
Sustainability is permanence. The social goal is not to have sustainable MFOs 
but rather to maximize expected social value less social cost through time. In principle, 
sustainability is not necessary nor sufficient for social optimality. In practice, however, 
sustainable MFOs tend to improve welfare the most. Most unsustainable MFOs inflict 
costs on the poor in the future in excess of the gains enjoyed by the poor now. 
Sustainability is not an end but rather a means to the end of improved social welfare. 
Thus outreach stands for the social value of loans from an MFO, and 
sustainability helps to maximize expected social value less social cost through time, 
including the surplus of users from loans and deposits, the profits or losses of the MFO, 
and the social opportunity cost of the resources used by an MFO. Sustainability affects 
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outreach since permanency tends to lead to structures of incentives and constraints 
that prompt all the groups of stakeholders in an MFO to act in ways that increase the 
difference between social value and social cost. 
In principle, a complete analysis of an MFO would use cost-benefit analysis or 
cost-effectiveness analysis to compare social value with social cost in general 
equilibrium. In practice, it is so expensive to measure social value and social cost that 
almost all talk proceeds in terms of outreach and sustainability in partial equilibrium. 
2.1 Six aspects of outreach 
2.1.1 Depth 
Depth of outreach is the value that society attaches to the gains from the use of 
microcredit by a given borrower. Since society places more weight on the poor than on 
the rich, poverty is a good proxy for depth. For example, society likely values the gains 
of a small loan to a street kid or a widow more than the same gains for a richer person. 
Deeper outreach usually increases not just social value but also social cost. As 
income and wealth decrease, it costs more for a lender to judge the risk of a loan. This 
happens since, compared to the rich, the poor are more heterogeneous and less able to 
signal their ability and willingness to repay {Conning, 1998). Fixed costs also matter 
more for the poor since their loans are smaller and have more frequent installments. 
Deeper outreach increases just social value and not social cost when an MFO 
finds better ways to judge risk at a cost less than the savings from the better 
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judgement. Such progress increases access, the ability and willingness to borrow and to 
repay at a price that covers the long-run cost of an efficient producer. Access is the 
nexus of creditworthine~emand based on ability and willingness to repay-and the 
lending technology-supply based on an efficient way to judge creditworthiness. More 
access is progress since loans depend more on creditworthiness and less on the 
constraints of the MFO to judge creditworthiness. For example, an MFO that does not 
need physical collateral to judge creditworthiness could serve poorer users and thus 
have deeper outreach, all else constant, than an MFO that requires physical collateral. 
2.1.2 Worth to users 
Worth of outreach to users is how much a borrower is willing to pay for a loan. 
Worth depends on the loan contract and on the tastes, constraints, and opportunities 
of the user. With the cost to the user constant, more worth means more surplus. 
2.1. 3 Cost to users 
Cost of outreach to users is the cost of a loan to a borrower. This is distinct 
from the cost of a loan to society or from the cost of a loan to an MFO. Cost to users 
includes both price and transaction costs. Price includes interest and fees. Prices paid 
by the user are revenues for the MFO. Transaction costs are non-price costs. They 
include both non-cash opportunity costs-such as the value of the time to get and 
repay a loan-and loan-related cash expenses such as transport, documents, food, and 
taxes. Transaction costs borne by the user are not revenues for the MFO. 
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The three aspects of depth, worth to users, and cost to users are tightly linked 
but still distinct. Surplus is the difference between worth to a user and cost to a user. It 
is the highest cost that the borrower would agree to bear to get the loan, less the cost 
that the borrower does in fact bear. In turn, depth of outreach reflects the social value 
attached to the surplus of a specific person. For example, $100 of surplus for a poor 
person may be worth more to society than $500 of surplus for a rich person. 
Costs to users can be measured as the present value of the cash flows associated 
with a loan, loan-related cash expenses, and time spent. Worth to users is more 
difficult to measure. Still, the relative worth of two or more loan contracts can be 
compared through their terms. If a borrower has alternative sources of loans, then 
surplus can be measured as the cost savings of a switch to an MFO. 
2.1.4 Breadth 
Breadth of outreach is the number of users. Breadth matters since the poor are 
many but the aid dollars are few. 
2.1.5 Length 
Length of outreach is the time frame in which an MFO produces loans. Length 
matters since society cares about the welfare of the poor both now and in the future. 
Without length of outreach, an MFO may improve social welfare in the short term but 
wreck its ability to do so in the long term. 
7 
In theory, an MFO can have length of outreach without sustainability if it had a 
fixed budget or an unending source of public support (Morduch, 1998a). In principle, 
such an MFO could live a long time. In practice, however, longer outreach through 
sustainability usually strengthens the incentives that serve to maximize expected social 
value less social costs through time. Without length, borrowers have few selfish reasons 
to repay since the MFO cannot promise to lend in the future. Loan losses shorten 
length of outreach in a downward spiral. Likewise, lack of profits prompts employees to 
strip the MFO bare and to bask in perks before the chance is gone. 
2.1.6 Scope 
Scope of outreach is the number of types of financial contracts offered by an 
MFO. In practice, the MFOs with the best outreach produce both small loans and 
small deposits. Deposits matter for two reasons. First, all poor people are 
depositworthy and save to smooth consumption, finance investment, and buffer risk. 
Fewer poor people are creditworthy. Second, deposits strengthen the incentives for 
sustainability and length of outreach. Depositors shun MFOs if they do not expect 
them to live to return their deposits. To attract and keep deposits, an MFO must 
please not donors and government but rather users and regulators. 
2.2 Trade-offs and feedback among the six aspects of outreach 
Depth is the social value of worth to users less cost to users. Breadth counts 
users, length counts years of service, and scope counts types of contracts. The proxies 
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are useful since direct measures of the social value of the output of an MFO are 
expensive. Outreach is the worth less cost of users, weighted by depth, summed across 
breadth of users and scope of contracts, and discounted through length of time. 
Social welfare depends on depth, worth, cost, breadth, length, and scope, but 
the greatest of these is length. In particular, more length in the short term requires 
more profit. This means higher prices, more cost to users, and less surplus per user. In 
the long term, however, the trade-off may vanish if the push for length leads to 
innovations in technology and organization that increase profits and/ or increase worth 
to users without parallel increases in social cost or in cost to users. Increased length 
feeds back to decrease social cost since users have more selfish reasons to repay. More 
scope also increases worth to users and strengthens the incentives that boost length. 
The debate over the social value of sustainability hinges on the effect of length. 
MFOs that do not aim for sustainability believe that the short-term increase in surplus 
caused by low prices swamps the effects of reduced length from low profits. MFOs that 
aim for sustainability believe the converse. 
The rest of this paper looks at evidence of depth of outreach for five MFOs in 
Bolivia. Even if society cares just for the poorest, however, the theoretical framework 
highlights that social welfare depends on more than just depth. Breadth affects the 
number of the poorest served, and cost and worth to users affect surplus. The poorest 
can use not just loans but also deposits, not just now but also in the future. 
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3. Poverty of borrowers from five Bolivian MFOs 
3.1 The five Bolivian MFOs 
By Latin American standards, Bolivia is a poor country. GNP per capita in 1995 
was about $700 (World Bank, 1996). The income distribution was highly skewed, and 
rural households in particular were very poor (UNDP, 1996). Still, Bolivia is a flagship 
for microcredit in Latin America and in the world. 
At the end of 1995, two of the five Bolivian MFOs studied were regulated and 
three were NGOs. BancoSol was a bank that came from an NGO. Caja de Ahorro y 
Prestamo Los Andes was a regulated non-bank. The three NGOs were Centro de 
Fomento a lniciativas Econ6micas (FIE), Fundaci6n para la Promoci6n y Desarrollo de 
la Microempresa (PRODEM), and Fundaci6n Sartawi. 
The five MFOs can be grouped by their lending technology and by their 
geographic market niche. In lending technology, BancoSol and PRODEM lend to 
groups, and FIE and Caja Los Andes lend to individuals. Sartawi lends both to groups 
and to individuals. In geographic market niche, PRODEM and Sartawi are mostly 
rural, while BancoSol, FIE, and Caja Los Andes are mostly urban. Thus BancoSol 
lends to urban groups, PRODEM lends to rural groups, and Caja Los Andes and FIE 
lend to urban individuals. Sartawi lends to rural groups and rural individuals. 
The five MFOs have some traits in common. They all work in niches untouched 
by traditional banks. All five grant small loans to first-time borrowers and make bigger 
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loans to repeat borrowers. All five charge high prices, and all five keep arrears and loan 
losses low with various mixes of screening, monitoring, and contract-enforcement. All 
five have received grants, free technical assistance, and low-priced loans from donors, 
but all five have also made progress toward sustainability. Compared with peers 
(Mlcrobanking Bulletin, 1998). all five have uncommon outreach and sustainability. 
Bolivia, while sparsely peopled, may have the densest microcredit in the world. 
The five MFOs studied here are the most important of the about 30 in Bolivia. They 
account for more than half of both clients and portfolio outstanding (La Raz6n, 1997). 
3.2 The data 
In November and December of 1995, we surveyed a random sample of 622 of the 
more than 52,000 borrowers active in the five MFOs at the end of September in the 
urban areas in and near La Paz and in the rural Altiplano near Lake Titicaca. Of the 
588 observations with complete data, 221 came from BancoSol. 124 from Caja Los 
Andes, 91 from FIE, 83 from Sartawi, and 69 from PRODEM. The survey included 
some questions from a 1992 census (Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1995). 
3.3 An index of fulfillment of basic needs 
3.3.1 Conceptual issues 
A vast literature explores ways to measure poverty (Lipton and Ravaillon, 
1995). Here, we matched some questions in our survey of borrowers with census 
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questions used in a national poverty assessment. The questions measured the use by a 
household of goods and services thought to be linked with the fulfillment of basic needs. 
The answers were condensed in an Index of Fulfillment of Basic Needs. This 
approach is common in Latin America. It requires (Boltvinik, 1994): 
(a) Theoretical definitions of basic needs and ways to satisfy them; 
(b) Choices of observable proxies that indicate degrees of fulfillment; 
(c) Norms that define the point where a need is considered unsatisfied; 
(d) Aggregation of indicators to construct an index; and 
(e) Choice of the poverty line for the index. 
3.3.2 Empirical issues 
The nationwide assessment chose the indicators, their norms, and the poverty 
line (Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1995). In most cases, the norm was the median 
of an indicator, but some cases had more complex norms. Like all measures of absolute 
poverty, the poverty line and the norms were at least somewhat arbitrary. The index 
was computed not for individuals but for households. It had four parts: 
1. Housing: 
(a) Type of materials used for floors, walls and roof; 
(b) Number of people per room. 
2. Access to public services: 
(a) Source of water; 
(b) Type of sewage system; 
(c) Access to electricity; 
(d) Type of fuel used to cook food. 
3. Education: 
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{a) Years of school completed; 
(b) Current attendance in school; 
(c) Literacy. 
4. Access to health services: 
(a) Use of formal health care; 
{b) Use of informal health care. 
Except for sewage, the urban and rural norms were the same. The Index of 
Fulfillment of Basic Needs (IFBN) was the simple average of the ratios of the four 
observed indicators K_J to their norms K.lnorm: 
( 1) 4 x IFBN = - <E _J_. 
4 J·l xJ norm 
The range of the ratio of K_J to K.lnorm depended on the range of answers in the 
nationwide assessment. The indicator for education was the average of indices for 
individual members of a household: 
where 
IE = - E I I ·L. ( 1 ) N ( y +s ) 
N l•l Y1norm +slnorm 1 
IE = Index of education of the household ; 
N = Number of members of the household; 
y1 = Years of schooling for person i; 
s1 = School attendance dummy for the age of person i: 
y !norm = Norm for years of schooling for the age of person i; 
s1norm = Norm for attendance for the age of person i; and 
L1 = Literacy dummy for person i. 
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(1) 
(2) 
The nationwide assessment set the poverty line at an IFBN of 0.9. Households 
below this were poor, and the rest were non-poor. The non-poor were sub-classified as 
fulfilled or threshold. The poor were sub-classified as moderate or poorest. 
The survey of borrowers included 56 percent of the indicators in the nationwide 
IFBN. Most of what was omitted had to do with access to health care. We believe this 
is highly correlated with the other indicators, so the comparison should not be biased. 
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4. Evidence of depth of outreach from Bolivia 
4.1 The population of La Paz 
The shares of the population of urban and rural La Paz in each of the four 
poverty classes are in Table 1 on page 32. Two features stand out. The first is the 
extent of poverty. In 1992, more than half the urban households were poor, and almost 
all rural households were poor. The second is the depth of rural poverty. Not only were 
96 percent of rural households poor, but 7 4 percent were among the poorest. In 
contrast, 17 percent of the urban households were in the poorest class. Poverty in 
Bolivia, especially rural poverty, was broad and deep. 
4.2 Borrowers of the five MFOs 
4.2.1 Distribution of the IFBN 
A box-and-whisker plot (Tukey, 1977) depicts the distribution of the IFBN for 
borrowers of the five MFOs (Figure 1 on page 31). We do not have data for a similar 
picture for the rural and urban populations. The IFBN is on the vertical axis. The 
poverty line is at 0.9. The MFOs are ordered from shallowest to deepest outreach. 
The width of each box reflects the sample size for each MFO. The box for 
BancoSol (n=221) is wider than the box of PRODEM (n=69). 
The height of the boxes marks the interquartile distance, the range between the 
second and third quartiles of the distribution. Less-disperse distributions have shorter 
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boxes. For example, the box for PRODEM is shorter than the box for Sartawi since the 
distribution of PRODEM is more clustered near the median. 
The whiskers beyond the boxes bracket either the extreme points in the data or 
1.5 times the interquartile distance from the median, whichever is less. In a Gaussian 
distribution, more than 99 percent of the data are inside the whiskers. The horizontal 
lines beyond the whiskers mark outliers. 
The light horizontal line in each box is the estimated median, and the grey 
trapezoids bound its 95-percent confidence interval. FIE had the highest median. Half 
the sample of FIE had an IFBN of more than 1.02, and the other half had an IFBN of 
less than 1.02. A Kolmogorov-Smimov test rejected the hypothesis that any of the 
distributions were Gaussian, so differences in medians were tested non-parametrically 
with Wilcoxon rank-sums (Hollander and Wolfe, 1973). The median of FIE (1.02) is 
greater than that of Caja los Andes (0.97) with more than 95 percent confidence. The 
borrowers of these two urban individual lenders clustered just above the poverty line in 
the threshold class. The median for BancoSol, the urban group lender, was at the 
poverty line (0.90). This is less than the other two urban medians with more than 99 
percent confidence. The median rural borrowers in Sartawi (0.71) and in PRODEM 
(0.67) were moderately poor. The rural medians were statistically smaller than the 
urban medians, but they were not statistically different from each other. 
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The Wilcoxon tests for differences in medians, as well as non-parametric 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for differences in the distributions of the IFBN for each of 
the five MFOs, suggest the same pattern of three depths of outreach: 
(a) Threshold group (FIE and Caja los Andes): 
(b) Poverty-line group (BancoSol): and 
(c) Moderately poor group (PROD EM and Sartawi). 
4.2.2 Distribution of the IFBN for borrowers versus the population 
We compare the estimated distribution of the IFBN among the poverty classes 
for the sample of borrowers from the five MFOs with the known distribution of a 
similar measure for all urban and rural households in La Paz (Table 1 on page 32). 
Since the share of borrowers in a poverty class is a random variable, we report non-
parametric bootstrapped 90-percent confidence intervals (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). 
We do not expect the sample and population distributions to match since 
creditworthiness and demand for microcredit depend on income and assets. All else 
constant, lenders can judge creditworthiness for rich people easier than for poor people. 
Suppose an MFO drew borrowers at random from the subset of the population that, 
given a lending technology, had demand and was creditworthy. Then the profile of 
borrowers, compared with the population, would be skewed toward the rich. 
We do not know the exact profile of demand and creditworthiness in Bolivia. 
Still, we can answer four useful questions. The first asks whether the poorest had the 
same share in the portfolio as in the population. The second asks how many of the 
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poorest were reached. The third and fourth questions ask how depth compared between 
group and individual loan technologies or between rural and urban market niches. 
4.3 Depth of outreach to the poorest of the poor 
This section analyzes the share of the poorest in the portfolios of the five MFOs 
and in the population. It also analyzes the number of the poorest reached. 
4.3.1 The share of the poorest in the portfolio and in the population 
Of all households in urban La Paz, 45 percent were non-poor (Table 1 on page 
32). For all three urban MFOs, the point estimate of the share of non-poor households 
exceeded the population parameter: 69 percent for FIE, 67 percent for Caja Los Andes, 
and 48 percent for BancoSol. The population parameter is within the 90-percent 
confidence interval for BancoSol but not for FIE and Caja los Andes. In rough terms, 
this means we can reject the hypothesis that FIE and Caja los Andes reached non-poor 
borrowers in proportion to their population share, but we cannot reject it for BancoSol. 
All three urban lenders had a statistically bigger share of threshold borrowers than did 
the population. Caja los Andes and BancoSol had a smaller share of borrowers in the 
fulfilled class than did the population, and FIE had a bigger share. 
For the moderately poor, the share was lower in FIE and in Caja los Andes 
(both 29 percent) than in the population (38 percent). The share for BancoSol was 
higher than in the population (47 percent). For the poorest, the shares of all three 
urban lenders (2 to 5 percent) were smaller than in the population (17 percent). Thus, 
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compared to the population, the urban lenders lent less to the fulfilled and to the 
poorest and more to the richest of the poor (threshold) and, in the case of BancoSol, to 
the poorest of the rich (moderate). 
The same pattern holds in rural La Paz. The non-poor were 5 percent of all 
rural households but 14 percent of PRODEM and 13 percent of Sartawi. In all rural 
households, 22 percent were moderately poor, and 74 percent were among the poorest. 
For PRODEM, 54 percent were moderately poor, and 33 percent were among the 
poorest. For Sartawi, 49 percent were moderately poor, and 36 percent were among the 
poorest. All the differences are statistically significant. 
Except for the fulfilled class and for the moderately poor in BancoSol. the profile 
of borrowers of each of the five MFOs is skewed toward the threshold class, compared 
with the profile of the population. This does not prove much, however, about depth of 
outreach. What matters is not whether the MFOs reached the poorest of the poor but 
whether the MFOs reached the poorest of those who demanded loans and were 
creditworthy. We do not have the data needed to answer this question. 
4.3.2 The number of the poorest in the portfolio 
If an MFO has broad outreach, then it might reach many of the poorest even 
though they are not a big share of the portfolio (Rosenberg, 1996). Point estimates of 
the number of total borrowers in each of the poverty classes are in Table 2 on page 33. 
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The numbers are the point estimates of the share of the portfolio in a poverty class 
multiplied by the total number borrowers in these MFOs in La Paz. 
The five MFOs reached about 4,500 of the poorest, 1,900 urban and 2,600 rural. 
This number depends on the relative share of the poorest in a portfolio and the 
absolute size of the portfolio. For example, the share of the poorest was about 4 percent 
in Caja Los Andes and about 5 percent in BancoSol. With about 30,000 total 
borrowers, BancoSol served about 1,400 of the poorest, while Caja los Andes, with 
9,200 total borrowers, served about 370. FIE, with the lowest share of the poorest and 
the smallest urban portfolio, had about 120 borrowers among the poorest. 
The rural MFOs were much smaller than the urban MFOs, but the share of the 
poorest in their portfolios was much higher. The effect of the greater share swamped 
the effect of the smaller portfolio. PRODEM, with about 2,500 borrowers in rural La 
Paz, served about 800 of the poorest, more than twice as much as Caja los Andes. 
Sartawi, with about 4,900 borrowers, had about 1,800 were among the poorest. This is 
400 more than BancoSol and almost as many as in the three urban MFOs combined. 
About 4,500 of the poorest households in La Paz had debt from the five MFOs 
in late 1995. Is this deep outreach? One way to check is market penetration, the ratio of 
borrowers in a given class in a given MFO to the number of households in that class in 
the population (Table 3 on page 34). In 1992, La Paz had about 260,000 urban 
households and about 160,000 rural households (Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 
1995). FIE reached about 2 percent of all urban households, Caja los Andes 4 percent, 
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and BancoSol 12 percent. Of all rural households, about 1 percent had debt with 
PRODEM, and about 2 percent had debt with Sartawi. 
Penetration in the market as a whole matters less than penetration in that part 
of the market with demand and creditworthiness. As before, we lack this data. Still, we 
know that urban lenders reached 38 percent of threshold households, 19 percent of 
moderately poor households, and 18 percent of all households. Given that not all 
households want debt at all times, that not all households can repay loans, and that 
there are other MFOs in urban Bolivia, this suggests scant room for more market 
penetration in urban areas. The amount of slack in rural areas is less certain. There, 12 
percent of the non-poor and 5 percent of the poor had debt at the time of the survey. 
This market penetration is much less than by the urban MFOs, but we do not know 
how much is possible since rural microcredit is more difficult than urban microcredit. 
The five Bolivian MFOs reached the richest of the poor and the poorest of the 
rich much more than they reached the poorest of the poor. This does not necessarily 
mean that the MFOs did a bad job. A loan that is not repaid is a gift. While there is 
nothing wrong with a gift, a gift in loans' clothing may backfire (Krahnen and Schmidt, 
1994; Adams, Graham, and Von Pischke, 1984). Also, outreach depends notjust on 
depth for the poorest but also on breadth, worth to users, cost to users, length, and 
scope for all households. These MFOs have uncommon breadth, worth, cost, and 
length. BancoSol and Caja los Andes take deposits and so have especially wide scope. 
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4.4 Depth by loan technology 
Sine both rural MFOs use group loans, we compare technology just for the 
urban MFOs so as not to confound the effects of technology with the effects of market 
niche. Compared to the individual lenders FIE and Caja los Andes, the group lender 
BancoSol had the smallest shares in the fulfilled and threshold classes and the biggest 
shares in the moderate and poorest classes (Figure 1 on page 31; Table 1 on page 32). 
BancoSol also had the most market penetration with almost one-fourth of the threshold 
class and 15 percent of the moderately poor (Table 3 on page 34). 
In general, the group-lending technology has more potential for deep outreach 
since it can substitute joint liability for physical collateral. Joint liability has high 
transaction costs, and it can also have high cash costs if borrowers must repay the 
debts of their comrades. Still, it attracts those who cannot or will not put up physical 
collateral. In contrast, individual lenders appeal to richer borrowers who can offer 
physical collateral and who want to avoid the other costs of joint liability. 
BancoSol had both the deepest and the broadest outreach of the urban lenders. 
This does not necessarily mean that BancoSol had the best outreach overall since the 
comparison ignores cost to users, worth to users, length, and scope. 
4.5 Depth by geographic market niche 
At first glance, rural lenders seem to have deeper outreach than urban lenders 
(Table 1 on page 32). About 86-87 percent of the rural borrowers were among the poor, 
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compared to 31-52 percent for urban borrowers. In fact, this comparison is not valid 
since it does not control for the different urban and rural distributions of poverty. 
Table 4 on page 35 controls for this. Each cell is the share of the portfolio in a 
given poverty class for a given MFO divided by the share of the population in the 
poverty class from Table 1 on page 32. A ratio of more than 1 means the share of 
clients in that class was greater than the share of the population in that class. A ratio 
of less than 1 means the opposite. 
If the poor were more concentrated in an MFO than in the population, then the 
ratios would increase from less than 1 in the leftmost columns to more than 1 in the 
rightmost columns. In fact, the pattern is the opposite (Table 4 on page 35). For all 
five MFOs, the ratios start near or above 1 in the leftmost column for the fulfilled and 
exceed 2 for the threshold class. The ratios decrease to the right for the moderately 
poor and still more for the poorest. As seen before, the profile of borrowers was skewed, 
not toward the poorest but toward those near the poverty line. 
The details of the broad pattern differ, however, for rural and urban MFOs. For 
example, in the threshold class, no urban lender had a ratio above 3.0, while the ratio 
for PRODEM was 4.8 and for Sartawi was 4.4. The rural MFOs mined the few non-
poor households more intensely than the many poor households. 
Among the moderately poor and the poorest, the rural lenders had higher ratios 
and thus deeper outreach than the urban lenders. This is a puzzle. If rural lending is 
more difficult than urban lending, then why did rural lenders have more depth? The 
23 
answer is probably that the urban lenders had not yet exhausted their non-poor niches. 
In contrast, the rural lenders were pushed to the poorest since they do not have as 
many non-poor borrowers to serve. For rural MFOs, the ratios of the share of the 
threshold class to the population share is 4.8 and 4.4, and the ratios for the moderately 
poor class are 2.4 and 2.2. For urban MFOs, the threshold ratios are about 2 or 3, and 
the moderate ratios are near 1. The rural lenders serve the richest of the poor and the 
poorest of the rich much more intensely than the urban lenders. The absolute number 
of rural non-poor households is small, however, and so the rural MFOs tum sooner and 
more often to the most difficult of all clienteles, the rural poorest. The greater depth of 
the rural MFOs suggests that the urban MFOs may not reach all of the urban poorest 
who are creditworthy and who want loans. 
In terms of market penetration {Table 3 on page 34), the two urban individual 
lenders, FIE and Caja los Andes, had about 1 and 2 percent of the poorest households 
in their portfolios. The urban group lender, BancoSol, served about 3 percent of the 
poorest. In rural La Paz, PRODEM reached about 2 percent of the poorest, and 
Sartawi reached about 4 percent of the poorest. Overall, about 4 percent of the urban 
poorest used MFOs, and about 2 percent of the rural poorest used MFOs. Thus the 
average rural borrower was more likely to be a member of the poorest than the average 
urban borrower, but the average urban household among the poorest was more likely to 
be a borrower than the average rural household among the poorest. 
24 
5. Summary and conclusions 
We analyzed the depth of outreach of five MFOs in La Paz, Bolivia. The first 
step was to construct a theoretical framework in which depth is one of six aspects of 
outreach. The second step was to compare the poverty of a sample of the borrowers of 
the five MFOs with the poverty of all the households in La Paz. 
We found five main results. First, improved social welfare from microcredit 
depends not just on depth of outreach but also on worth to users, cost to users, 
breadth, length, and scope. Length matters most since the drive for length leads to 
incentives that prompt improvements in the other aspects. Second, the MFOs in La 
Paz tended to serve not the poorest but rather those near the poverty line. Most MFOs 
will probably serve this same niche. Few of the poorest are creditworthy and demand 
loans, and many of the non-poor can borrow elsewhere. Third, the distribution of 
demand and creditworthiness unconditional on supply is unknown, so we cannot say 
whether the Bolivian MFOs had deep outreach in an absolute sense. Fourth, group 
lenders in La Paz had deeper outreach than individual lenders. In general, group 
technologies will have the most potential for deep outreach since they substitute joint 
liability for the physical collateral that the poorest may not own. Fifth, the rural MFOs 
in La Paz had deeper outreach than the urban MFOs in the sense that the typical rural 
borrower was more likely to be among the poorest. At the same time, the urban MFOs 
had more market penetration among the poorest due to their bigger portfolios. 
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These results on depth of outreach do not tell whether the five MFOs did well in 
terms of all six aspects of outreach. On the one hand, it may be that the drive for 
length and breadth is what prompted these MFOs to grow and to have some depth. On 
the other hand, perhaps these MFOs would have reached more of the poorest had they 
stayed small and unprofitable with a single-minded focus on depth. The theoretical 
framework described here can help to make more explicit the judgements used to 
choose which focus to take. This can only help to improve social welfare. 
The empirical results sketch some of the limits of microcredit for the poorest of 
the poor. They highlight the need for more scrutiny of the flood of funds budgeted in 
the name of access to loans for the poorest. Even when microcredit does reach the 
poorest, it may not increase incomes as much as smooth consumption (Mosley and 
Hulme, 1998; Morduch, 1998b). Even if it turns out that MFOs do not reach relatively 
or even absolutely many of the poorest, this shallow depth may be more than balanced 
by the use of MFOs by those near the poverty line. 
Microcredit may or may not be a good development gamble. If donors and 
governments have social welfare in mind, then they should check whether microcredit is 
the best way to spend public funds earmarked for development. Is microcredit 
worthwhile or worthless? The theoretical framework here is a better way to judge this 
than simple measures of the number of the poorest served by an MFO. 
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Figure 1: Box-and-whisker plot of the distribution of the IFBN for sampled borrowers from the 
five MFOs 
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Non-poor Poor 
n Fulfilled Threshold Sub-total Moderate Poorest Sub-total 
Range of index 2.0 to 1.1 1.1 to 0.9 2.0 to 0.9 0.9 to 0.6 0.6 to 0.0 0.9 to 0.0 
Urban La Paz 436 28 17 45 38 17 55 
FIE 91 26-35-44 25-34-43 62-69-77 21-29-36 0-2-5 23-31-38 
Caja Los Andes 124 14-19-25 40-48-55 60-67-73 23-29-35 2-4-7 27-33-40 
BancoSol 221 12-16-20 27-33-38 43-48-54 42-47-52 2-5-7 46-52-57 
Rural La Paz 152 2 3 5 22 74 96 
PROD EM 69 0-0-0 6-13-20 6-13-20 43-54-64 24-33-43 80-87-94 
Sartawi 83 0-2-5 7-12-18 8-14-20 40-49-58 28-36-45 80-86-92 
All figures are percentages. Point estimates and census parameters are in boldface, and 90-percent confidence bounds for 
the point estimates are in regular font. The figures for the population of urban and rural La Paz do not have 
confidence intervals since they are not estimates but rather parameters from a census (Ministerio de Desarrollo 
Humana, 1995). The figures for the MFOs were computed from the survey by the authors. Rows may not sum to 
100 due to rounding. 
Table 1: Point estimates and bootstrapped non-parametric 90-percent confidence intervals 
for the distribution of the Index of Fulfillment of Basic Needs among poverty classes 
for borrowers from five MFOs in La Paz, Bolivia, and for all households in urban and 
rural La Paz 
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Non-poor Poor 
Fulfilled Threshold Sub-total Moderate Poorest Sub-total Total 
Urban La Paz 8,500 16,000 25,000 18,000 1,900 20,000 45,000 
FIE 1,900 1,900 3,900 1,500 120 1,600 5,500 
Caja Los Andes 1,800 4,400 6,200 2,700 370 3,000 9,200 
BancoSol 4,800 9,800 15,000 14,000 1,400 15,000 30,000 
Rural La Paz 120 1,000 1,100 3,700 2,600 6,300 7,400 
PROD EM 0 360 360 1,300 800 2,100 2,500 
Sartawi 120 650 770 2,400 1,800 4,200 4,900 
Total La Paz 8,600 17,000 26,000 22,000 4,500 26,000 52,000 
Survey by the authors and Table 1. Rows and columns may not sum to totals due to rounding 
Table 2: Estimated breadth of outreach by number of clients in a poverty class for 
borrowers from five MFOs in urban and rural La Paz 
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Non-poor Poor Total 
Fulfilled Threshold Sub-total Moderate Poorest Sub-total 
Urban La Paz 12 38 22 19 4 14 18 
FIE 3 5 3 2 0.3 1 2 
Caja Los Andes 3 10 5 3 0.8 2 4 
BancoSol 7 23 13 15 3 11 12 
Rural La Paz 5 15 12 11 2 4 5 
PROD EM 0 0.2 0.07 1 2 2 1 
Sartawi 0.2 2 0.7 2 4 3 2 
All figures are percentages computed from Tables 1 and 2 and from Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano (1995). Numbers 
may not sum totals due to rounding. 
Table 3: Market penetration by poverty class for five MFOs in La Paz 
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Urban La Paz 
FIE 
Caja Los Andes 
BancoSol 
Rural La Paz 
PROD EM 
Sartawi 
Fulfilled 
1.2 
0.7 
0.6 
0.0 
1.6 
Non-poor 
Threshold 
2.1 
2.9 
2.0 
4.8 
4.4 
Computed from Table 1 as described in the text. 
Sub-total 
1.6 
1.5 
1.1 
3.2 
3.5 
Moderate 
0.7 
0.8 
1.2 
2.4 
2.2 
Poor 
Poorest 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.5 
0.5 
Sub-total 
0.5 
0.6 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
Table 4: Ratios of the IFBN for clients of the five MFOs to the IFBN for the urban or rural 
population near La Paz 
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